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The end of Sleeping Beauty’s nightmare
Abstract
The  way  a  rational  agent  changes  her  belief  in  certain 
propositions/hypotheses  in  the  light  of  new evidence  lies  at  the  heart  of 
Bayesian inference.  The basic natural  assumption, as summarized in  van 
Fraassen’s Reflection Principle ([1984]),  would be that in the  absence of 
new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are 
claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such 
examples,  if  not  settled,  would  demonstrate  the  inconsistency  and/or 
incompleteness  of  the  Bayesian  approach  and  without  eliminating  this 
inconsistency, the approach cannot be regarded as scientific. 
The Sleeping Beauty Problem is just such an example. The existing 
attempts to solve the problem fall into three categories. The first two share 
the  view that  new evidence  is  absent,  but  differ  about  the  conclusion  of 
whether Sleeping Beauty should change her belief or not, and why. The third 
category is characterized by the view that, after all, new evidence (although 
hidden from the initial view) is involved.
My solution is radically different and does not fall in either of these 
categories. I deflate the paradox by arguing that the two different degrees of 
belief presented in the Sleeping Beauty Problem are in fact beliefs in two 
different  propositions,  i.e.  there  is  no  need  to  explain  the  (un)change  of 
belief.  
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1 The Sleeping Beauty Problem
The  Sleeping  Beauty  Problem  is  a  paradox  in  probability  theory  that  has  recently 
received much attention in the literature. Sleeping Beauty (SB) undergoes the following 
experiment (the setup of which is known to her). She is put to sleep on Sunday evening. 
Then an experimentalist tosses a fair (50:50) coin. If the result is Heads, she is woken 
on Monday only. If the result is Tails, SB is woken twice, on Monday and on Tuesday. 
In addition, she is given a special drug that causes her to forget whether she was woken 
on the day before or not. Thus, when she is woken she does not know whether it is 
Monday or Tuesday. Each time she is woken she is asked to give her credence the coin 
landed Heads. The ‘problem’ is that the two following answers both seem to be valid1: 
(a) On the one hand, on Sunday SB believed that the coin is fair and the probability 
that it will land Heads is ½. The fact that SB has been woken does not give her 
1  There are several versions of the problem and a few variations of how the experiment is conducted. 
These variations are, however, not crucial for the argument of the present article.
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any new relevant information, because she knew all along that she is supposed to 
be woken at least once anyway. Thus, her credence ought to stay the same as on 
Sunday, i.e. 1/2.     
(b) On the other hand, on a long series of trials the number of times she will be 
woken after the coin landed Tails is twice the number of times SB will be woken 
after the coin landed Heads. Thus, her answer should be 1/3.   
Two remarks should be made about these answers. First, the question posed to 
SB is a question about her credence upon awakening. This is not a question about the 
nature of the coin. Thus, any change of SB’s credence (if any) must not be interpreted as 
a change of her opinion about the nature of the coin. Second, the plausibility of the 
answer (b) can be made more profound. There is no qualitative difference between the 
original formulation of the SB problem and its following modification. Suppose that SB 
is put to sleep on New Year’s Eve. At 12pm the champagne is opened and the fair coin 
is tossed. Subsequently, if it lands Tails, SB is woken on every single day during the 
year, i.e. 365 times, if the coin lands Heads she is woken only once on one (arbitrary) 
day during the year.  In this experiment, therefore, SB’s choice will be between ½ and 
1/366.  One would find much harder  to  argue  in favour of  ½ in  this  case.  With  an 
appropriate modification of the experiment,  the second number can take any rational 
value. It will be especially difficult to maintain the answer of ½ in the limit of that 
number going to zero. 
2 The problem deflated
2.1 From contradiction to consistency
How can the problem be resolved? The existing approaches in the literature are 
characterized by a common assumption (explicit or implicit) that the reasoning (a) is in 
logical contradiction with the reasoning (b). Therefore, the usual efforts to solve the 
problem focus on demonstrating that, despite the apparent correctness of both (a) and 
(b), one of them is false (Weintraub [2004]).  And there is a good deal of controversy 
amongst  philosophers  about  which  one!  “Thirders”  are  trying  to  provide  various 
explanations  why  SB  ought  to  change  her  belief  from  ½  on  Sunday  to  1/3  on 
awakening. “Halfers”, on the contrary, are trying to justify why her belief ought to stay 
the same,  i.e.  ½.  Combining above with the view on the presence/absence of new 
evidence  the  existing  strategies  to  solve  the  problem  can  be  classified  into  three 
categories. The first two share the view that new evidence is absent, but differ about the 
conclusion of whether SB should change her belief or not, and why–“thirders” Elga 
([2000]),  Vaidman and Saunders ([2001]),  Monton ([2002]),  Hitchcock ([2004]) and 
“halfers”  Lewis([2001]),  Meacham  ([2005]),  White  ([2006])2.  The  third  category  is 
characterized by the view that, after all, new evidence (although hidden from the initial 
view) is  involved–“thirders” Dorr([2002])3,  Arntzenus ([2003])4,  Weintraub ([2004]), 
Horgan ([2004], [2007]). 
2  Strictly speaking, White does not explicitly states that he is a “halfer”. He proposes a generalized 
version  of  the  problem,  which  apparently  poses  a  challenge  for  “thirders”,  in  particular  Elga-Dorr-
Arntzenius arguments, but which does not pose any problems for “halfers”. Though, Horgan ([2007]) 
denies that White’s argument poses any problem for his approach.    
3   Dorr's argument was disputed by Bradley ([2003]).
4   In his earlier article Arntzenius ([2002]) maintained a view that upon awakening SB should not have a 
definite belief at all due to her cognitive malfunction.
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My approach is completely different. I question the very basic assumption that 
(a) contradicts (b) and deflate the problem by arguing that this contradiction is merely 
apparent. In other words, I show that there is no contradiction between SB’s belief that 
the coin is fair, i.e. upon tossing on Sunday the probability of the coin to land Heads is 
equal ½, and her credence of 1/3 upon awakening that the result of coin tossing was 
Heads. Thus, on the one hand, I agree with “thirders” that her credence on awakening 
should be 1/3, but on the other hand, I show that there is no need for SB to change her 
belief. One belief does not contradict the other.
Moreover,  this  contradiction  can  be  dissolved  solely  in  the  framework  of 
standard probability theory.  I show that no additional arguments going beyond basic 
probability theory such as appeals to the relevance of a rational agent’s ‘own temporal 
location’ (Elga [2000]) or the difference between knowing all along that SB will be 
woken and knowing that she is woken now (Weintraub [2004]) are needed. 
I  will  argue  that  both  (a)  and  (b)  are  correct  answers  but  to  two  different  
questions. SB is asked to give her credence, i.e. the degree of belief, in the particular 
value of physical or epistemic probability, of a certain event. However the phrase “the 
coin landed Heads” alone does not define that event completely. As I will discuss in 
detail in the course of this article, an experimental  setup is necessary to describe an 
event.  In  the  question  posed  to  SB we  implicitly  assume  that  setup.  This  setup  is 
wakening (and interviewing)5. Thus, the question posed to her is ‘What is your credence 
the coin landed Heads under the setup of wakening?’ It can be rephrased as ‘What is 
your credence that this awakening is a Head-awakening under the setup of wakening?’ 
And  the  correct  answer  should  be  (b).  However,  “the  coin  landed  Heads”  with  a 
different setup will form a different event. In particular, “the coin landed Heads under 
the setup of coin tossing” would be a different event. If we asked SB ‘What is your 
credence that the coin landed Heads under the setup of coin tossing?’, then the correct 
answer would be (a) [SB still believes that the coin is fair]. At first sight, these two 
questions might seem similar, especially because there is a one-to-one logical cause-
effect  correspondence  between  them.  Nevertheless  they  are  not.  Consequently,  the 
corresponding probabilities are different as well. Thus, the source of the problem is that, 
although, the former question is the one that is posed to SB, one tends to confuse it with 
the latter question, thereby arriving at a paradox. 
The aim of the rest  of the article is  to  justify the argument  presented in the 
preceding paragraph, and, in particular, to provide detailed explanation of why those 
two questions are different and why the two events associated with them are different as 
well.
The following notation will be used below:
P(A)      – the probability of an event A,
P(A/B)  – the conditional probability of an event A given that an event B has 
                 occurred.
Trial      – a single run of the complete experiment starting with the act of coin tossing 
                 and ending with one or two awakenings.
5   Note that including a setup in the definition of an event is different from the conditioning of credence 
of the event on evidence. SB does not receive any new evidence upon wakening, yet the credences are not 
the same, because the setups, and therefore the events, are different. 
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2.2 The inanimate version 
In order to emphasize the objective mathematical character of this illusion and 
eliminate every possible psychological/subjective aspect often surrounding this paradox, 
I will present it with the following inanimate version of the problem. Let me replace the 
coin,  the  experimentalist  and  SB  by  the  following  automatic  setting:  an  automatic 
device tosses a fair coin, if the coin lands ‘Tails’ the device puts two red balls in a box, 
if  the coin lands ‘Heads’  it  puts  one green ball  in  the box. The device  repeats  this 
procedure a large number of times, N. As a result the box will be full of balls of both 
colours.
The device’s task now is to determine the probability that if it picks up a ball 
from the box at random, this ball will be a green ball. The device may calculate this 
probability theoretically using the relative frequency definition of probability6. At large 
N the probability of picking up a green ball, P(green←box), is numerically very close to 
the ratio of the number of green balls to the total number of balls in the box:
                P(green←box)≈N(green)/N(green+red).                (1) 
Because the coin is fair then in the long run it will land ‘Heads’ approximately N/2 
times. Therefore, the number of green balls in the box will be approximately half of the 
total number of trials, N(green)≈N/2. Similarly, N(red)≈N. Thus, N(green+red)≈3N/2, 
and we obtain
                                                P(green←box)=1/3.                                     (2)
The device may, of course,  verify this result  experimentally simply by counting the 
numbers of balls in the box. 
On the other hand, since the event ‘Coin landed Heads’,  P(H), is necessarily 
followed by the event ‘A (one) green ball is put in the box’ (green→box) there is one-
to-one correspondence between these two events, i.e.
                  P(green→box)=P(green→box /H) P(H)
                                          =P(H/green→box)P(green→box)= P(H),         (3)
according to Bayes' rule. Now we have arrived at a critical point. The core of the whole 
confusion is that we tend to regard ‘A (one) green ball is put in the box’ and ‘A green 
ball is  picked out from the box’ as equivalent. Subsequently we combine (2) and (3), 
thereby (mistakenly) concluding that the probability of ‘Coin landed Heads’ is 1/3. But, 
of course, it is not!
The reason is that the event ‘A green ball is put in the box’ and the event ‘A 
green ball  is  picked out  from the box’  are  two  different events,  and therefore  their 
probabilities are not necessarily equal. These two events are different because they are 
the subject to different experimental setups: one is the coin tossing, other is picking up a 
ball at random from the full box7. The probability to put a green ball in the box on each 
6   Note that here as well as in the original statement of the paradox, as formulated by Elga ([2000]), the 
frequentist definition of probability is used in (b).  In subsequent discussions, though, Elga ([2000]) and 
other authors based their arguments mainly on the application of the principle of indifference and on Bas 
van Fraassen’s reflection principle, rather than on frequentist definition of probability. In this article I use 
the frequentist  definition simply because it  does the job perfectly.  Moreover,  the way I dissolve the 
problem implies that application of Bayesian methods will not lead to any contradictions as well.
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coin tossing trial is ½, but the probability to pick out a green ball from the full box at the 
end is 1/3! This might seem paradoxical, but there is no contradiction. 
So, how from the first ½ do we get that only 1/3 of all balls in the box are green, 
and therefore 1/3 as the probability to pick out a green one? Although the probability of 
a green ball being put in the box in each trial is ½, the average number of green balls 
which the device puts in the box on each trial is 1/3. That is why at the end the number 
of green balls in the box is half the number of red ones. Let me show this calculation in 
detail.
The total average number of balls which the device puts in the box on one trial 
is:
Nav[green+red→box]= P(H)∙1+ P(T)∙2=3/2.
Here I take into account the fact that if the coin lands Tails then two red balls go into the 
box. Therefore,
Nav[green→box]= P(H)∙1/ Nav[green+red→box]=1/3.
2.3 Back to SB
Hopefully, now everyone is convinced that there is nothing wrong in believing 
in both propositions:  the probability of a green ball being put in the box equals 1/2 and 
the probability of a green ball being picked out from the box equals 1/3. The case of SB 
should be no different.
Indeed,  in  a  direct  analogy  with  the  experiment  described  above,  SB’s 
‘Head/Tail’-awakenings are just like those green/red balls. In the long run of N coin 
tossing  trials  there  will  be twice  as  many Tail-awakenings ‘in  the box’  than Head-
awakenings, where an awakening is the analogue of ‘being picked out from the box’. 
The probability that ‘This awakening is a Head-awakening under the setup of wakening’ 
is 1/3. However, although a Head-awakening is necessarily preceded by the coin landing 
Heads, the probability of ‘The coin landed Heads under the setup of coin tossing’ is ½, 
i.e. on each coin toss the probability that one Head-awakening will be ‘added to the box’ 
is ½. Yet, the average number of Head-awakenings ‘added to the box’ on each coin 
tossing trial  is  1/3.  Thus everything  is  consistent.  And the answer depends on what 
precisely  do  we  mean  by  the  question.  If  we  mean  ‘This  awakening  is  a  Head-
awakening  under the setup of wakening’, then SB's answer to our question should be 
1/3, but if we mean ‘The coin landed Heads under the setup of coin tossing’, her answer 
should be 1/2. 
After all these explanations, you might still wonder why the original question is 
so ambiguous. The two setups are very different from each other. So, why do we tend to 
confuse them if they are not mentioned in the question explicitly? One tends to assign 
the probability of 1/3 to the event ‘The coin landed Heads’ if one assumes ‘The coin 
landed Heads under the setup of wakening’ instead of ‘under the setup of coin tossing’. 
But  what  sense  does  it  make  to  define  such  an  event?  As  the  Head-awakening  is 
necessarily preceded by the coin landing Heads, the above formulation is equivalent to 
7   This emphasises the fact that an experimental setup or condition of an event is essential for its (event’s) 
definition (Shaposhnikov [1987]). Even two similarly-looking events are different if they are subject to 
different conditions. Thus, we should define the two above events more precisely as  ‘A green ball is 
picked out from the box under the setup that the device picks out a ball from the full box’ and ‘A green 
ball is put in the box under the setup  that the device tosses a fair coin’.
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‘This awakening is a Head-awakening under the setup of wakening’. The interpretation 
of the latter is clear and was given in the preceding paragraph. The interpretation of the 
former version might be the following. To say that the awakening is a Head-awakening 
is to say that the last time the coin was tossed it had landed Heads, and the experimenter 
recorded this  result  (say by writing it  on a piece  of  paper).  To ask SB to give the 
probability of ‘The coin landed Heads under the setup of wakening’ means to ask her to 
give the probability of finding ‘Heads’ written now on that piece of paper.
The  answer  1/3  is  often  justified  by  an  appeal  to  the  betting  approach  to 
probability–e.g.  see  Hitchcock  ([2004]).  (Although,  some  authors,  e.g.  Bradley  and 
Leitgeb  ([2006]),  dispute  its  applicability  to  SB  problem).  There  is,  obviously,  no 
contradiction  between  the  argument  of  this  article  and  the  betting  approach,  which 
corresponds to the setup of wakening. Indeed, the number of times SB gives a right 
answer relative to the number of times she is asked is what counts here. The number of 
times SB is asked equals the number of times she is woken. This is clearly the setup of 
wakening. (The drug makes each of these questionings independent of the others.)
3 Summary
The concept  of an  event is  central  and crucial  in Probability Theory.  The Sleeping 
Beauty Problem arises due to improper use of the notion of an event. The setup under 
which the event takes place must always be taken into account. If we do so, then we 
realize that the original question posed to SB can be interpreted in two different ways. 
The first interpretation is ‘What is your credence that the coin landed Heads under the 
setup of coin tossing?’, and the answer should be ½. The second interpretation is ‘What 
is  your  credence  that  this  awakening  is  a  Head-awakening  under  the  setup  of  
wakening?’, and the answer should be 1/3. Thus there is no paradox!
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